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Comments  and 
Discussion 
Stephen  M. Goldfeld: This is a useful and eminently  readable  paper.  It 
treats a number  of important  issues that have been around  for a while, 
but Friedman  manages  to pull them together  in a quite  neat way. There 
are several  major  topics covered  in the paper  and I will say a few words 
about  each. 
The first issue is that of transactions  crowding  out. Friedman's  main 
contribution  here is in providing  some estimates  of the degree  of crowd- 
ing out, while indicating  the potential  need for a term-structure  adjust- 
ment when long-term  rates enter  the IS curve  but short-term  rates enter 
the LM curve. There is one minor technical  inelegance  in the calcula- 
tions-the  use of elasticity  estimates,  stemming  from log-linear  LM and 
IS curves,  is not quite  reconciled  with  Friedman's  development  based  on 
a linear  model.  However,  the effect  of this  is probably  small.  There  is also 
an asymmetry  of sorts-Friedman computes  the degree  of crowding  out 
for alternative  estimates  of the LM curve  but  for only one estimate  of the 
IS curve. Because there is hardly  unanimity  on spending  elasticities,  it 
would be nice to know the sensitivity  of the results to alternative  IS 
curves.  In this regard,  some evidence  available  from  simulations  of exist- 
ing econometric  models  could  be brought  to bear.  The one virtue  of these, 
as opposed to the estimates  Friedman  reports,  is that they cope with a 
variable  price  level and  take account  of the cyclical  state  of the economy, 
both of which  are factors  that should  influence  the extent  of transactions 
crowding  out. 
The second  topic covered  in the paper,  and really  the most important 
one, is the discussion  of portfolio  crowding  in or crowding  out. Friedman 
derives  a simple,  understandable  result  in terms  of the coefficients  of the 
asset-demand  equations  and makes  clear what empirical  magnitudes  are 
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necessary  for deciding  in favor  of crowding  in or crowding  out. It should, 
of course,  be noted that the specific  formula  that is obtained  is quite  de- 
pendent on a number  of strong assumptions  about specification.  These 
include  linearity  of the asset-demand  functions  in interest  rates,  income, 
and wealth; and symmetry  of the interest  rate coefficients  across equa- 
tions. Relaxing  these assumptions  would clearly  change  the formula  but 
would not affect  the main point. In fact, a recent paper  by Cohen and 
McMenamin,  referred  to by Friedman,  arrives  at qualitatively  similar  re- 
sults  in the context  of a model  with  somewhat  different  functional  specifi- 
cations. 
Functional  details aside, there is another  sense in which Friedman's 
setting is restrictive:  it is a static one-period  story. While that is the 
simplest  way to clarify  what is occurring,  it does leave out some poten- 
tially important  features.  There  is, for example,  the question  of stability 
as originally  examined  by Blinder  and Solow. The Cohen  and McMena- 
min paper  mentioned  above does examine  this question  and finds  prob- 
lems of stability  when bonds are close substitutes  for equities.  I assume 
the same  difficulty  would  arise  in a dynamic  version  of Friedman's  model 
so that one should  probably  not take too seriously  the case where  port- 
folio crowding  out leads to a negative  fiscal  multiplier. 
Another  dynamic  aspect  which  is missing  is that  portfolio  crowding  in 
or crowding  out in the real world  is not a timeless  phenomenon.  One has 
to be precise about the relevant  horizon  because  it is easy to construct 
situations  in which portfolio crowding  in prevails  over one time period 
and crowding  out over another.  Indeed,  the presence  of lags in the kinds 
of asset-demand  equations  alluded  to in the latter  part  of the paper  could 
well, as an empirical  matter,  produce  this  result.  A related  point  concerns 
the treatment  of the various  interest  rates. Once one moves beyond the 
one-period  model  or undertakes  empirical  work,  the relevant  interest  rates 
are holding  period  yields. Furthermore,  the relevant  yields may differ  in 
the asset equations  and in the IS sector.  As a consequence,  considerable 
effort  may be necessary  to define  "the"  bond rate  or "the"  equity  rate. 
Taken as a whole, these considerations  suggest  that a complete  condi- 
tion for portfolio crowding  in or crowding  out will be somewhat  more 
complicated  than  Friedman's  formula  and,  further,  that  empirical  evalua- 
tion of any  such  formula  is no simple  task. 
A third  issue Friedman  addresses  is the role of wealth  in the demand 
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ing out cannot occur. To preserve  this possibility,  Friedman  seeks to 
demonstrate  the statistical  significance  of a wealth  variable.  (For crowd- 
ing out to emerge,  the wealth effect would have to be "large"  and not 
just statistically  significant,  but this issue is not addressed.)  While  I be- 
lieve a plausible  case can be made for a statistically  significant  wealth 
effect, I do not consider  the evidence  Friedman  offers  particularly  per- 
suasive.  He observes  that,  while wealth  is insignificant  in a basic money- 
demand  function  estimated  through  1972, extending  the sample  period  to 
1977 makes wealth "work."  However, this equation  hardly forms the 
basis  for a strong  case: it fails a stability  test, and  has some quite  strange 
parameter  estimates.  Friedman  does report that an equation  including 
wealth  but  excluding  income  is stable  and  that  at least  one version  of such 
an equation  extrapolates  well in the post-1972 period.  This, however,  is 
not a serious  specification  because,  as Friedman  notes, the issue is not 
whether  to exclude  income  but  rather  whether  to include  wealth.  Further- 
more,  the wealth-only  equations  have implausibly  slow speeds  of adjust- 
ment and, as I have found, perform  terribly  in out-of-sample  extrapola- 
tions for earlier sample periods. It seems, then, that there is no fully 
satisfactory  equation  exhibiting  a significant  wealth  effect. 
Some  evidence  exists,  however,  to support  Friedman's  case  in my 1976 
paper  in BPEA, which  Friedman  cites. There,  I reported  that a nominal 
adjustment  model in per capita terms exhibited  both significant  wealth 
and income variables,  even if the sample  period stopped  in 1973. Fur- 
thermore,  the various  details contained  in tables 7 and 8 of that paper 
show that in extrapolations  starting  as early as 1966, the equation  with 
wealth  and  income  forecasted  better  than  the equation  with  income  alone. 
I did not develop  these results  because  I was focusing  on the post-1973 
experience  and there,  as is evident  from  Friedman's  results,  the equation 
with wealth  and income  is not satisfactory.  On the whole, I would  regard 
this earlier  evidence as bolstering  Friedman's  case, although  to me the 
recent  period  remains  somewhat  of a puzzle. 
Friedman  does note these issues in his discussion  of Michael Ham- 
burger's  results,  and I should  like to indicate  briefly  why I do not think 
Hamburger  has solved the recent money puzzle. The main wrinkle  in 
Hamburger's  equation  seems to be the use of two long-term  rates  of re- 
turn, including  the dividend-price  ratio. Friedman,  in fact, improves  on 
the extrapolative  performance  of this equation  by substituting  wealth  for 
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ongial  equation  nor Friedman's  modification  stand  up to close scrutiny 
since the real reason  these equations  work is that they constrain  the in- 
come elasticity  to unity. This serves to drive up the coefficient  of the 
lagged money stock (that is, lower the speed of adjustment)  by a sub- 
stantial  amount,  something  that tends  to happen  to the "basic"  equation 
as it falls apart (see Friedman's  table 4).  It is therefore  not surprising 
that this kind of restriction  tends to produce  a better  forecast.  Unfortu- 
nately, the restriction  is not valid because  the hypothesis  of the unitary 
income elasticity  is readily  rejected  by the data through  1973. Further- 
more,  when  this  restriction  is relaxed  in the context  of Hamburger's  speci- 
fication, the resulting  equation  both fails a stability  test and forecasts 
poorly.  On balance,  then,  I am not persuaded  that  the wealth  variable  has 
a major role to play in understanding  the recent behavior of money 
demand. 
My final brief comment  is on the policy role for debt management 
posited  in the last part  of the paper.  The argument  makes  good sense,  but 
I doubt that the empirical  magnitudes  warrant  much of a practical  role 
for  debt management.  The evidence offered linking changes in  the 
maturity  of the federal  debt and the recent  behavior  of investment,  while 
interesting,  seems circumstantial  at best. Furthermore,  because  of prob- 
lems in coping with the need for expectations  in constructing  holding 
period yields, this is a difficult  problem  on which to get solid empirical 
evidence. Nevertheless,  Friedman  himself has already done important 
work  in this area  and should  be encouraged  to carry  out further  research 
along  the  lines  he indicates  at the  end  of the  paper. 
John H. Kareken:  Friedman  has given us a thorough  appraisal  of the 
claim that "debt-financed  deficits  'crowd  out' interest-sensitive,  private- 
sector spending,"  and we should all, I think,  feel indebted  to him for it. 
As he suggests  in his paper, though,  for those who are sure that price 
stability  is desirable,  there  is another  argument  against  government  defi- 
cits, even those  financed  by bond  issues.  In his words,  it is that  "what  mat- 
ters  for prices  is not only the money  stock  but some  combination  of money 
plus the outstanding  interest-bearing  government  debt." And because 
Friedman  has been so thorough  in his appraisal  of the "crowding-out" 
argument,  I will spend  the time allotted  me on that possibility.  That  may 
be irresponsible,  but  I do not think  so. The routine  of the Brookings  panel 
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Friedman  my criticisms  of his first  draft,  and I am quite  willing  to accept 
his appraisal  of them,  as revealed  by the changes  he saw  fit to make. 
In his paper  Friedman  remarks  that  of late no one has taken  at all seri- 
ously, to the point of carefully  examining  it, the possibility  that  how gov- 
ernment  deficits  are  financed  is of no consequence.  His explanation  is that 
the monetarist  tide has been running  too strong.  But Friedman  is not ex- 
actly right. My colleague Neil Wallace has considered  the possibility. 
The paper  in which  his analysis  appears,  "The  Overlapping  Generations 
Model  of Fiat Money,"  has not yet been published,  or indeed  even  widely 
circulated,  so Friedman  can hardly  be chided  for not having  been more 
diligent  in his search  of the literature. 
What  Wallace  shows in his paper  is that, to a first approximation,  it 
matters  not at all how the government  deficit  is financed.  The size of the 
deficit  certainly  matters;  but how it is financed,  whether  by issuing  bonds 
or by printing  more  money,  does not. To rephrase  Wallace's  result,  open 
market  operations  amount  to nothing (or little) more than central  bank 
busy  work.  That,  it seems  to me, is right,  and what  I thought  I would  do 
now, if without  much  hope of convincing  anyone,  is to give a loose para- 
phrase  of the proof of that proposition.  I want to be clear that the para- 
phrase  is mine  alone.  Wallace  may  have  bungled  badly,  but  no one should 
conclude  that  before  perusing  his  paper. 
To isolate the effects  of an open market  operation,  it is necessary  to 
hold fiscal  policy constant.  On that,  I believe,  there  is general  agreement. 
For a single economy  of the sort I have in mind, it suffices  to hold the 
government  budget deficit (or, more accurately,  the time path of the 
deficit) unchanged.  Because  government  spending  has a social optimum, 
transfer  payments  and tax receipts, or the net thereof, must therefore 
be adjusted  in such a way as to offset any change  in the government's 
net worth  that results  from the open market  operation.  With a properly 
defined  or truly  ceteris  paribus  open market  operation,  the net worth  of 
the government  is unchanged.  But it follows that, in effect, the balance 
sheet of individuals  is also unchanged.  And in consequence  the equilib- 
rium  of the economy  is unaltered.  With the balance  sheet of individuals 
unchanged,  or in effect unchanged,  future-period  consumption  options 
are  precisely  what  they  were,  and  therefore  the current-period  equilibrium 
is precisely  what  it was. Not even the price  level changes  as a result  of an 
official  asset exchange.  That is the inevitable  result  of assuming,  reason- Benjamin  M. Friedman  647 
ably  enough,  that  for money,  as for all other  assets,  the essential  question 
is "What  rate  of return  does it offer?" 
An example  may be helpful.  Imagine  a two-asset  economy  with, say, 
real  capital  in the form  of a storable  consumption  good, and  paper  money, 
the liability  of the government.  And suppose  for definiteness  that  the gov- 
ernment,  engaging  in an open market  operation,  increases  the amount  of 
capital it owns and perforce its money indebtedness.  Since its budget 
deficit cannot change, it must transfer  back to individuals  whatever 
change  in its net worth  is implied  by the assumed  exchange.  The transfer 
payments  must be distributed  appropriately.  The distribution  of income 
cannot change with an open market  operation.  If it did, fiscal policy 
would  not be unchanged.  Equally  obvious,  the transfer  payments  may  be 
negative.  If the capital  acquired  by the government  is risky,  as it must  be 
for portfolio diversification,  there may be an implied decrease in net 
worth,  and  it may  therefore  be required  that individuals  be taxed. 
For an unchanged  government  deficit  it is necessary  that transfer  pay- 
ments  depend  on the current  state  of the world.  That  observation  is basic, 
and explains  why, whatever  appearances  may be, the balance sheet of 
individuals  does not really change.  Because  the government  must  return 
whatever  it earns  on any  increment  of capital  (or, more  generally,  earning 
assets) that it acquires,  the amount  held by individuals  does not really 
decrease.  Nor in effect  is there  any  increase  in the real  balances  owned  by 
individuals. 
The conventional  analysis goes astray in concentrating  on seeming 
changes,  on changes  that disappear  with the necessary  adjustments  that 
keep the net worth of government  constant.  It takes seriously  that the 
money held by individuals  increases  when, for example,  the government 
buys back some of its bonds. But that increase  is, in a word,  fictitious.  I 
can put the argument  another  way. One gets the right  answer  to the ques- 
tion "what happens  when the government  engages in an open market 
operation?"  by looking at the consolidated  balance  sheet of individuals 
and government.  Clearly,  whatever  assets are exchanged  by the govern- 
ment  and individuals,  that  balance  sheet  remains  what  it was. 
Or to put the argument  yet another  way, individuals  pierce  the veil of 
government.  They are forced to do that by the required  adjustment  in 
transfer  payments.  In the world  of Franco  Modigliani  and  Merton  Miller, 
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veil, if perhaps  not quite  in the same  way that  judges  have. And in Wal- 
lace's world, individuals  pierce the government  veil. What Wallace  has 
given  us then  is Modigliani  and  Miller  all over again.  The corporations  of 
the world  of Modigliani  and  Miller  are  financial  intermediaries,  and so is 
the government  of Wallace's  world. 
As mght be expected, the conclusions  that open market  operations 
are pointless  is not perfectly  general.  An official  asset exchange  of suffi- 
cient  magnitude  can change  the equilibrium  price  of money.  If the  govern- 
ment acquires  more capital  than  individuals  would  have, individuals  will 
want  less money,  and  the price  of money  will therefore  adjust.  That  is not 
to say, though,  that the traditional  analysis  is right.  Moreover,  as John 
Bryant  and Wallace  have shown,  if there  is a reserve  requirement,  then 
how the government  is financed  does matter.'  And depending  on what 
government  and  private  transactions  costs are,  it may.  But that  there  may 
be more or less deadweight  loss, depending  on how a given fiscal  policy 
is financed,  is not the traditional  conclusion,  and  it would  seem  reasonable 
that as a practical  matter  macroeconomists  can safely ignore whatever 
changes  in deadweight  loss result  from  open market  operations. 
Before stopping  I want  to anticipate  a couple  of possible  objections  to 
what I have said. The first  can be cast in question  form. What  about  all 
those  studies  which  show  that  money  and  prices  move  together?  The  diffi- 
culty is, though,  that many of the most dramatic  changes  in the money 
supply  were not produced  by official  asset exchanges.  A coinage  debase- 
ment is not an open market  operation.  The discovery  of gold in Mexico 
was not. The several  U.S. banking  panics  were not. There  is all the dif- 
ference in the world between an open market  operation  and a change, 
however  brought  about,  in private  wealth.  All the simple  regression  stud- 
ies that have been done can therefore  simply  be dismissed.  And the evi- 
dence from  multiple  regression  studies  is hardly  more impressive.  There 
are few if any that are not subject  to Robert  Lucas'  criticism.  I know of 
none. 
The other  possible  objection,  which  does have to be taken  more seri- 
ously,  is that  of the overlapping  generations  or money-as-a-store-of-value 
1. See John Bryant and Neil Wallace, "The Inefficiency  of a Nominal National 
Debt," staff report 28  (Federal Reserve Bank of  Minneapolis, 1977)  (Journal of 
Political Economy, forthcoming); and Bryant and Wallace "Open Market Opera- 
tions in a Model of  Regulated, Insured Intermediaries,"  staff report 34  (Federal 
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model.  Allegedly,  it can deliver  only half-truths.  In the real world,  so the 
argument  goes, money  serves  both as a store  of value  and  as a medium  of 
exchange.  But in the world  of overlapping  generations,  it serves  only as a 
store  of value.  Unfortunately,  there  is no time  to argue  the  issue.  All I can 
do is say that  I believe  the criticism  is wrong.  I would grant  though,  that 
until  someone  has managed  the near-impossible,  until someone  has mod- 
eled a world of more or less continuous  exchange  of goods and money, 
we will not be quite  sure  about  the overlapping  generations  model or the 
radical  conclusions  that  it yields. 
Michael Hamburger:  I liked Friedman's  paper, particularly  because it 
examined  the relative  degree of substitutability  among different  assets. 
The relative substitutability  issue is a way of gaining insight into the 
debate over monetarism,  because monetarists  believe that money is a 
substitute  for a wide range  of both financial  and real assets, while non- 
monetarists  confine  the range  of money  substitutes  to a narrow  range  of 
short-term  financial  assets. I was disappointed,  however,  that the paper 
did not advance  our empirical  knowledge  on the substitutability  question. 
All the money-demand  equations  estimated  by Friedman  contain only 
two interest  rates, both yields on nominal  financial  assets. He goes to 
great pains to argue  that the return  on the real asset that I used-the 
dividend-price  ratio-served primarily  as a proxy  for the price  of equities 
or wealth. That claim is not supported  by other work I have done on 
U.S. money-demand  equations  for a variety  of periods  or on similar  equa- 
tions  for the United  Kingdom,  in which  this  ratio  was a better  explanatory 
variable  than  was the price  of equities  or wealth. 
The analysis  of the effects of putting  wealth in the money-demand 
function  is also important.  According  to Stephen  Goldfeld's  discussion, 
his finding  that wealth is not a significant  explanatory  variable  stems 
largely  from the 1950s and early 1960s. Friedman's  results  raise doubts 
about the generality  of these findings  and thus tend to support  Brunner 
and  Meltzer  on the importance  of wealth  in the money-demand  function. 
I would be interested  in seeing the results  Goldfeld  discussed  which, 
in his view, suggest  that  my analysis  solves the recent  money  puzzle  only 
because  the income  elasticity  is constrained  to unity.  Without  examining 
his findings,  I can only report  that the constraint  on the nominal  income 
elasticity  is not binding;  when it is estimated  freely, it comes out to be 
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significantly  less than one during  the sample  period,  this finding  has no 
important  effect  on the out-of-sample  residuals.  Hence, the results  I am 
aware  of indicate  that the solution  to the post-1974 money  puzzle  is not 
dependent  on the constraint  on the income elasticity  of money  demand. 
If others  have different  results,  I would like to see them. 
Finally, contrary  to Friedman,  I hope that we do not try to establish 
debt-management  policy as an important  element  of stabilization  policy 
in the United States.  The unhappy  British  experience  of using monetary 
policy largely for debt-management  purposes should warn us against 
such a course.  In addition,  there  is a great  deal of evidence  that changes 
in the composition  of debt do not have much  effect.  It seems  noteworthy 
that the average  maturity  of the debt rose substantially  during  periods 
such as the mid-1960s,  which  were excellent  ones for real investment. 
General  Discussion 
Friedman  addressed  some comments  to his formal discussants.  He 
first observed  that, at least according  to John Kareken's  presentation, 
the paper by Neil Wallace  had finally supplied  the thesis that "money 
does not matter."  Since  the recent  positions  in the profession  range  from 
"only money matters"  to "money  also matters,"  the Kareken  position 
clearly  expands  the spectrum  of views  on the efficacy  of monetary  policy. 
Friedman  said that he hoped  that  people  who advanced  the view that  in- 
come is determined  by bonds  plus money  would  recognize  their  disagree- 
ments  with monetarists  who see income  determined  by money alone. 
Friedman  agreed  with Goldfeld on the point that, in principle,  ex- 
pected holding period yields-that  is, yields that included expected 
changes  in asset  prices-rather than  measured  yields  ought  to be in asset- 
demand  functions,  and  with  Michael  Hamburger's  view  that  the yields  on 
a wide spectrum  of assets  should  appear  in the money-demand  function. 
In fact, in empirical  work carried  out for the paper and mentioned  but 
not reported,  he had attempted  (with only partial success)  to relate 
money  demand  to the expected  holding-period  yields, adjusted  for infla- 
tion, on money  itself and four alternative  assets. 
Saul  Hymans  felt that  Friedman  had  provided  a valuable  exposition  of 
the framework  for analyzing  crowding  out and crowding  in. He added Benjamin  M. Friedman  651 
that crowding  in was the long-run  prediction  of the Michigan  model, 
which specified  a demand  function  for liquidity  aggregating  money and 
bonds.  As Hymans  saw it, his work  suggested  that  bonds  are  a closer  sub- 
stitute  for money than they are for capital,  and hence that crowding  in 
prevailed. 
Other discussants,  however, introduced a variety of  reasons why 
crowding  in might  be less likely than  Friedman's  paper  implied.  Rudiger 
Dornbusch, George von Furstenberg,  and Frederic  Mishkin all ques- 
tioned  the implicit  assumption  of the paper  that  financial  effects  on invest- 
ment demand  depended  solely on changes  in the return  on capital.  They 
pointed  out that, if investment  demand  were linked  to the cost of capital 
(equity  and debt) or to James  Tobin's  q, which  reflected  both equity  and 
debt  valuation,  higher  bond  yields  associated  with  financing  deficits  would 
show up as a greater  depressant  of investment,  thus decreasing  the prob- 
ability  of crowding  in. Friedman  agreed  that,  in a complete  model  includ- 
ing private  debt and corporate  equities,  the investment-demand  function 
would be linked  to both corporate  bond and equity  yields.  He explained 
that he had simplified  the analysis  for expositional  purposes  by adjusting 
for debts  within  the private  sector,  and he argued  that the simplification 
did  not alter  the qualitative  considerations  affecting  crowding  in or crowd- 
ing out. Arthur  Okun  supported  Friedman's  response,  suggesting  that  his 
verdict  could be upset only if bonds and real capital  were  gross comple- 
ments-which seemed  highly  unlikely. 
Von Furstenberg  remarked  that  the short-run  character  of Friedman's 
analysis  biased the result toward  crowding  in. The paper focused on a 
situation  in which the volume of government  bonds increases,  while the 
quantities  of money  and capital  are  unchanged.  In that situation,  it is not 
surprising  that the required  return  on capital  is likely  to decline.  But von 
Furstenberg  argued  that, in such a case, the government  neither  absorbs 
cash nor uses resources,  merely  distributing  bonds to the public as gifts 
(or creating  a "rainshower"  of bonds). In an actual deficit operation, 
however, the quantity  of capital can remain  unchanged  in the face of 
government  dissaving  only if that dissaving  is offset  fully by extra  private 
saving. For the actual deficit  operation,  von Furstenberg  expressed  his 
judgment  that  crowding  in was at most  a "curiosity."  Friedman  countered 
that he saw no problem  in assuming  that,  for the short-run,  extra  private 
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standard  models of income determination.  He agreed,  however,  that an 
analysis  of the long-run  consequences  had to rely on a dynamic  model 
taking  account  of other considerations  affecting  capital  formation. 
Edmund  Phelps elaborated  on some of the distinctions  and interrela- 
tionships  between short-run  and longer-run  adjustments.  For the short 
run, he felt that an unanticipated  antirecessionary  increase  in public ex- 
penditure  might  exert its primary  stimulative  effect  on inventory  invest- 
ment, fixed investment  being largely predetermined  for quite a while. 
But if  an addition to public expenditure  is  expected to persist over 
the long run and to have ultimately  an unfavorable  impact  on fixed  capi- 
tal formation,  that adverse  expectation  may affect  the short run. Under 
those conditions,  the stock  market  might  fall promptly,  and  thus  fixed  in- 
vestment  might  be dampened  rather  than  stimulated  in the near  term. 
Michael Wachter  and Martin Feldstein suggested  that crowding  in 
would appear  less likely in a more  realistic  model that took into account 
supply  constraints  and  some degree  of price  flexibility.  Wachter  surmised 
that the various elasticities  might be different  at various stages of the 
cycle, shifting  toward  the crowding  out result  in periods  of high utiliza- 
tion. Feldstein  stressed  that price flexibility  strengthened  the traditional 
mechanism  of crowding  out: the inflation  generated  by fiscal stimulus 
would reduce  real monetary  balances.  Friedman  agreed  that the supply 
side effects  from which he had abstracted  would push toward  crowding 
out; but he noted that he had also abstracted  from accelerator  effects  on 
investment  that  would  push  toward  crowding  in. 
The discussion  also focused on the policy implications  of Friedman's 
analysis.  Dornbusch  doubted  that changing  the maturity  structure  of the 
federal debt could be an effective  policy, and cited evidence  that short- 
term  and  long-term  securities  are  highly  substitutable.  Franco  Modigliani 
shared  that view, and reported  on his analysis  of the one historical  at- 
tempt to affect interest rates through  debt management,  the so-called 
operation  twist.  He had found  that  the changes  in the relative  supplies  of 
long-term  and short-term  debt had had no effects.  Moreover,  this was 
fortunate  since  actually  operation  twist  had  lengthened,  rather  than  short- 
ened, the maturity  of the debt-accomplishing the opposite  of what had 
been intended. Friedman noted, however, that the recent degree of 
lengthening  of the debt  was considerably  larger  than  that  during  operation 
twist. He stressed  furthermore  that both Modigliani's  research  and that 
mentioned  by Dornbusch  had used an unrestricted  reduced-form  meth- Benjamin  M. Friedman  653 
odology in contrast  to the richer  structural  approach  adopted  in his own 
and Roley's work that had found much lower estimated  elasticities  of 
substitution. 
Modigliani  was also unconvinced  that  wealth  played  an important  role 
in the money-demand  function.  He agreed  with Goldfeld's  interpretation 
of the empirical  results.  Furthermore,  he stressed  that the demand  for 
money in recent  years should be overpredicted  by any function  not ex- 
plicitly allowing for recent innovations  in banking  that had facilitated 
economizing  on demand  deposits.  Thus  he was skeptical  of any equation 
that  fitted  well without  allowing  for these  institutional  changes.  Moreover, 
he saw  no analytical  reason  for wealth  to influence  money  demand.  Fried- 
man countered  that portfolio shifts generate  a transactions  demand  for 
cash, and their  magnitude  had to be related  to the total size of portfolios; 
that alone could account  for the small, although  significant,  wealth  elas- 
ticity he had found. 
Robert Hall suggested  that the paper presented  an overly optimistic 
view of fiscal policy by underestimating  the interest  elasticity  of invest- 
ment demand.  He contrasted  Friedman's  use of differing  estimates  of the 
interest  elasticity  of the demand  for money  with his concentration  on a 
single estimate  of that of investment  demand.  Hall considered  that esti- 
mate implausibly  low. Estimates  of the interest-elasticity  of investment 
demand that seemed more accurate  to Hall implied that fiscal policy 
would have little efficacy. Friedman mentioned a  paper by  Olivier 
Blanchard  that had obtained  similar  empirical  results  to his on the in- 
terest elasticity  of investment  while using an analytical  approach  more 
sympathetic  to Hall's. But he felt that professional  knowledge  of that 
magnitude  was weak and  identified  it as an important  item on the agenda 
for  future  research. 
Speaking  of other  research  needs for the future,  William  Brainard  em- 
phasized  the difficulty  of estimating  the required  rate  of return  on capital, 
which  is important  in determining  the relative  substitutability  among  as- 
sets relevant  to the crowding-out  question.  The valuation  of corporations 
reflects  the "expected  marginal  product  of capital"-profit expectations, 
taxes and  the like as well as the required  return  on real capital.  It is diffi- 
cult to distinguish  changes  in the required  return  from changes  in these 
other factors  affecting  market  valuation.  He also indicated  that his joint 
work  with Tobin,  which  used panel  data to study  the determinants  of the 
valuation of firms, suggested substantial  year-to-year  changes in the 654  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1978 
required  return  on capital and a looser relationship  than is typically 
assumed  between  this rate and the rates  of return  on financial  assets. 
William  Poole pointed  out that the typical  discussion  of fiscal policy 
ignored  the effect of inflation  in reducing  the real value of the federal 
debt. When  the real capital  losses of bondholders  are taken  into account, 
it becomes evident that fiscal policy has been much less stimulative  in 
recent  years  than  it appears  when  viewed  in purely  nominal  terms.  Modi- 
gliani  strongly  supported  Poole's  point, and  emphasized  that  the national 
income  accounts  should  be adjusted  to reflect  it: a major  portion  of gov- 
ernment  interest  payments  does not really  represent  income,  but is merely 
a restitution  of the real  principle  of bondholders.  George  Jaszi  said that, 
while it was potentially  an important  economic  phenomenon,  the estima- 
tion of the inflation  premium  in federal  interest  payments  posed  analytical 
issues  that  lay outside  the scope of accounting  procedure. 
Michael  Boskin  noted a number  of other  measurement  and  conceptual 
issues about  the public  debt.  In principle,  as he saw it, the key fiscal  var- 
iable  is the debt of total government-federal,  state, and local-and  that 
total has been declining  relative  to GNP in recent years. He also iden- 
tified as an important  unsettled  issue the appropriate  treatment  of the 
implicit  debts associated  with government  commitments  for future  bene- 
fits  in social  insurance  programs. 